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ABSTRACT
Scotland is typically regarded as a mixed jurisdiction based on
an assessment of its combination of civilian and common law
traditions. If this narrow definition of “mixture” is opened up, one
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will find several other traditions which are constituent parts of the
Scottish legal tradition. Those range from the seemingly remote
Celtic and udal law, through feudal and canon law, to the law of
the European Union and the European Convention on Human
Rights. An holistic approach to the question of mixture requires
that each of these traditions is accounted for, especially because of
the difficulties in assessing the legacy of any given tradition. Those
difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that legal traditions are
indiscrete or “impure”, having been the subject of influence,
modification, contamination, borrowing and so forth. They have
mixed with other traditions, and some have conveyed parts of
others. By focusing on the civilian and common law traditions, we
risk adopting a reductionist approach to the question of mixture by
essentially excluding vital parts of the story: which other traditions
were (or are) part of the mixture, which parts disappeared or were
subsumed into other traditions, which aspects of one tradition were
conveyed by another. An holistic approach also recommends that
the predominantly private law oriented focus of the literature is
opened up to analysis of public law and criminal law. That will
likely bring out further aspects which show that the pedigree of
Scots law is a mixture, not only of civilian and common law
ingredients, but also of other diverse traditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Scotland is often described as a “mixed” jurisdiction. Whilst
some have claimed that it is the only such system in Europe, 1
others may disagree with that proposition.2 We are told, at any
rate, that Scotland is the oldest among those jurisdictions
comprising the world's “third” legal family. 3
1. Hector L. MacQueen, Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence: Scotland,
29 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 309, 310 (2001).
2. See, for example, arguments advanced that Cyprus and Malta are also
mixed systems—see, respectively, Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as a Mixed
Legal System, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 37; and Kevin Aquilina, The Nature and
Sources of the Maltese Mixed Legal System: A Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde?, 4 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013).
3. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001); Mauro Bussani &
Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Liability Regimes of Europe – Their Façades and
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That may be so under a specific casting of the mixed
jurisdiction category, principally understood as one combining
civilian and common law traditions. In that sense, Konrad
Zweigert and Hein Kötz argued that “Scots law deserves particular
attention from comparative lawyers as a special instance of the
symbiosis of the English and Continental legal traditions.” 4 That
may be understood within what has been said to be “characteristic
of mixed jurisdictions,” namely “to retain private civil law within a
surrounding system of Anglo-American public law.” 5 T.B. Smith
described the mixed jurisdiction as “basically a civilian system that
had been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law
and has in part been overlaid by that rival system of
jurisprudence.” 6 Similarly, Niall Whitty described it as usually
meaning “a civilian system overlaid by the common law.” 7
Whilst this civilian and common law dichotomy would
inevitably place Scotland in a “mixed” category, it represents just
one perspective on the concept of “mixture”. If we reconsider what
it is that constitutes mixture, in particular by forcing the definition
open beyond a simple civilian and common law antithesis, might
we change our view of the extent to which Scotland is a mixed
jurisdiction, or whether it is a special case among jurisdictions in
being “mixed”?
The question becomes one of what, exactly, is being mixed? As
Esin Örücü has pointed out, not all mixed systems would be

Interiors in PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE 143 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon
Valentine Palmer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
4. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 204 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
5. BUSSANI AND PALMER, supra note 3, at 143.
6. T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed
Jurisdictions” in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 2-3 (A.N. Yiannopoulos
ed., Louisiana State Univ. Press 1965).
7. Niall R. Whitty, The Civilian Tradition and Debates on Scots Law,
TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG 227, 232 (1996).
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mixtures of the same ingredients. 8 This fact has not gone unnoticed
in the literature. Vernon Palmer proposed three principal
characteristics by which mixed jurisdictions might be identified.
First, they should be “built upon dual foundations of common-law
and civil-law materials,” and even although other systems “present
diverse mixes,” including traditions of religious law, indigenous
custom and so on, “common law and civil law [should] constitute
the basic building blocks of the legal edifice.” 9 Second, the
presence of these dual elements should be “obvious to an ordinary
observer.” 10 Third, there is a structural allocation of content: “the
civil law will be cordoned off within the field of private law, thus
creating the distinction between private continental law and public
Anglo-American law.” 11 Notwithstanding Palmer's definition,
which marks off the “mixed jurisdiction” from jurisdictions with
traditions otherwise mixed, the basic analytical framework still
draws on a civilian and common law dichotomy. 12
In Scotland, it is well documented that there is a mixture of
civilian and common law traditions. 13 However, if one were able to
reach into the legal system and remove the civilian and common
law components, would all of its content have been extracted? The
answer to that must be firmly negative. If one is receptive to the
footprint or legacy of other legal traditions in Scots law, they will
find them. Those other traditions, too, are part of the mixture; one
8. See Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or
Expansion?, 12 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2008).
9. PALMER, supra note 3, at 7-8.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id.
12. Palmer has acknowledged the limitations of a straight civilian and
common law dichotomy. He also outlined the difference in approach between
scholars studying mixture within the civilian and common law framework—
whom he described as “scholars in the classic mixed jurisdiction tradition,” and
those of a more liberal persuasion who may be regarded as legal pluralists. See
Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems – The Origin of the Species, 28
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 103 (2013).
13. See, for example, Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal
Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 228
(1998); W.D.H. Sellar, Scots Law: Mixed from the Very Beginning? A Tale of
Two Receptions, 4(1) EDIN. L. REV. 3 (2000); and Whitty, supra note 7.
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which is in Scotland revealed as much more diverse than the initial
hybrid of civilian and common law traditions may have suggested.
Moreover, even if those comprise the two principal traditions in
Scots law, it will be asked whether a quantitative approach is
appropriate.
This article considers the mixed quality of Scots law and the
Scottish legal tradition in four contexts, each of which is intended
to point to a deeper and fuller concept of mixture in the mixed
jurisdiction analysis.
The first is an historical perspective: if the civilian and
common law traditions are not the only traditions which have left a
legacy in the Scottish legal order, what others might be identified?
This section gives a brief and non-exhaustive outline of other
traditions which have featured in the evolving Scottish legal
tradition, namely Scottish common law, feudal law, canon law,
udal law, Celtic law, the Bible, and foreign maritime law.
Second, the argument is made that an “updated” view of mixed
jurisdiction must take account of the extent to which two major
streams of law have permeated Scots law in more modern times —
those of the European Union (EU) and the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). These cannot be excluded from the
analysis, and whilst they may constitute part of the mixture in any
jurisdiction to which they relate, that fact alone necessarily
distinguishes those jurisdictions from the majority of the world's
jurisdictions where neither EU law nor ECHR law is applicable.
Moreover, the particular character and structural features of EU
and ECHR law are such that they do not receive monolithic,
uniform application in each jurisdiction. They gain the colouring of
local institutional and normative features which vary among
jurisdictions.
The third aspect discussed is one of methodology: an holistic
approach is required for the question of mixed jurisdiction. It
should be asked whether a quantitative, or some other, framework
of analysis is preferred for evaluating whether and to what extent
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individual constituent traditions should feature in the discussion.
Consideration should be given to how one accounts for temporal
dimensions, how one addresses the question of legacy, and the
extent to which legal traditions are indiscrete or “impure”. This
section will reflect on these issues.
Fourth, it is suggested that the extent to which private law
analysis has dominated mixed jurisdiction scholarship has the
potential to misrepresent, or only partially represent, the nature of
the law and legal system in general. In particular, the discussion
may be said to take insufficient account of public law, criminal law
and other areas which lie beyond the field of private law. The risk
arises that jurisdictions are in general classified according to
definitions and analyses conducted along private law fault lines.
The suggested outcome is that, if and until other areas of law are
properly accounted for, it may be appropriate for the private law
literature to explicitly confine itself to private law, and be cautious
about purporting to speak to the nature of the wider law and legal
system in general terms.
The view taken by this article is very much a general one
which aims to address Scots law and the Scottish legal system at
their widest extent. That position is purposely taken, both as a
response to the tendency of the mixed jurisdiction literature to
focus on a private law analysis, 14 and because there appears little
reason in principle to begin with a magnified view of any one
substantive area of law (such as private law) and to recede from
that point to a more general analysis. An alternative approach may
have been to move from the principal focus of the literature—
private law—out to a more general analysis, however that would
reinforce the notion that private law is the natural starting point for
the discussion, and the article seeks to contest that idea; at least
until (should one be forthcoming) a convincing explanation is
given as to why private law should be the main focus of an holistic
14.

See infra section IV.
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mixed jurisdiction discussion which can faithfully be said to
address the general law and legal system at large. The article
therefore raises a series of questions which it is hoped will feed
into a discussion on the proper parameters and methodology of the
mixed jurisdiction commentary.
By final word of introduction, this article is concerned with
“sources” in the sense of the pedigree of law—that is to say,
streams or currents of legal tradition. It does not discuss “sources”
in the sense of resources of law, such as legislation and the
common law, although these are often the media through which
legal traditions are conveyed.
II. TRADITIONS OF LAW IN SCOTLAND: HISTORICAL
In line with the principal orientation of the mixed jurisdiction
literature on a civilian and common law axis, the contemporary
debate on the mixed character of Scots law has primarily been
conducted on the same axis.
Even if the civilian and common law elements were the main
contributors to Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition as now
understood, it is perhaps surprising that such little attention has
been given to other contributing traditions in the context of a
mixed jurisdiction analysis. The accent on civilian and common
law elements is subject to a range of possible criticisms: it is too
simplistic an analysis; it is reductionist; it suggests that these are
pure and discrete traditions; it is a Eurocentric analysis (and
therefore ill-suited for application in a global comparative law
context); 15 and so on. The reductionist criticism is particularly
instructive because it points to the fact that in measuring a system
with a civilian and common law yardstick, the legacy of other
traditions is essentially left out of the discussion. That legacy may
manifest directly in the Scottish legal tradition, or even indirectly
15. Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South
East Asia, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35, 49 (2002).
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through another tradition—including through the civilian and
common law traditions.
This section outlines some of the other traditions which jostle
for recognition of their own respective places within the Scottish
legal tradition. Rather than attempting to restate the effect of the
civilian and common law traditions in Scotland, the opportunity
will instead be taken to give an overview of traditions with a less
remarked footprint. The traditions identified are not exhaustive—
this is a necessarily brief overview, but should give a taste of the
plurality and variety of those traditions.
A. Scottish Common Law
When the “common law” is discussed in the Scottish context,
reference is typically made either to the common law tradition
deriving from England, or common law as a non-statutory resource
of law.
There is recognised to have been, however, a Scottish
“common law” in the sense of a more indigenous common law
tradition inherited in the mediaeval period. This likely comprised
significant elements derived from the English common law
tradition, but with Scottish usages, additions and innovations. This
would precede the main period of civil law reception in Scotland,
as well as the main period of common law reception.
The common law of Scotland 16 was a feature of the historical
circumstances of the kingdom, and whilst it would include aspects
of other legal traditions—such as English common law, mediaeval
Roman law and canon law influences—there is also recognised to
have been a body of “native Scottish customs,” the first known
reference to that “common law” being in a royal brieve from

16. Noting that the approximate geopolitical territory of Scotland as now
understood took shape from around the 9th to the 13th centuries. See also infra
note 90.
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1264. 17 This law was “common” in the sense that it derived from
customs common to the various peoples who together made up the
people of the Scottish kingdom. 18 The mediaeval Parliament of
Scotland not only enacted programmatic statutes, with their
connotations of positivity, but also expressed the accumulated
customs—the “common law”—of the realm. 19
Custom should be understood as an important source (or
expression) of “law” in earlier periods in Scotland; indeed, as it
was elsewhere in Europe. David Ibbetson identified three senses in
which the term “custom” (consuetudo) can be understood in the
context of mediaeval Europe. First, it refers in its least technical
sense to the way in which a social group orders its affairs; the way
in which things are done. Second, custom is distinguishable from
lex: whilst lex is written law (ius scriptum), custom is unwritten
(ius non scriptum). They are, however, complementary, in the
sense that lex can record customs, clarify them or recognize them
as authentic or authoritative. Third, custom is distinguished from
lex, but rather than being understood as complementary, lex
prevails: it conditions custom. 20
The importance of custom in the specifically Scottish context
comes through in several senses.
First, the kingdom was not socially or demographically
cohesive, at least to the extent that it would become: custom was
therefore about drawing out “the way things were done” from a
variety of social groups. Second, jurisdiction was scattered through
a broad array of courts, officials and other bodies. Their
jurisdiction was sometimes overlapping or even competing, and
they were not united in a defined jurisdictional hierarchy: practices
17. A.M. GODFREY, CIVIL JUSTICE IN RENAISSANCE SCOTLAND: THE
ORIGINS OF A CENTRAL COURT 18 (Brill 2009).
18. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 22,
para. 359, Butterworths LexisNexis.
19. See GODFREY, supra note 17, at 18.
20. David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law in THE NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW 153-155 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard
Murphy eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
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and usages common to these fora could therefore be regarded as
customs in a broader sense. Third is the related fact that there was
no centralised, characteristically judicial forum until the
establishment of the Court of Session (or College of Justice) in
1532: until then, no single judicial institution had the capacity and
jurisdiction to regularize the application and implementation of law
throughout the kingdom. Underlying patterns or commonalities
therefore pointed to customs in the realm. Fourth, Parliament was
not purely a legislative body as now understood. Not only did it
perform an additional, adjudicative function, its statutes were not
always programmatic in nature. Instead, they often promulgated
and gave regularised form to existing customs. Finally, the
resources of law were not widely recorded in writing. The “way
things were done” would therefore embody a bottom-up,
constitutive approach to custom, rather than a top-down,
prescriptive approach expressed in legal writings.
The common law of Scotland was not confined to substantive
content, but necessarily entailed more structural aspects, especially
in the context of the emergence of a general framework or system
of jurisdiction across the kingdom. Mark Godfrey has written
extensively on this subject in the context of the emergence of the
Court of Session as a supreme civil court in Scotland in the 16th
century. 21 The ultimate normative authority of the monarch was
essentially the unifying factor in an array of jurisdictions, exercised
by a multitude of persons, officials and bodies, the jurisdictions of
which were, as noted, sometimes overlapping or even competing.
The common law would in this context emerge through common
practices or applications of law, or the manner in which remedies
were awarded. The various jurisdictions hung together under a
general governing role exercised by the King in Council and
Parliament, but the mediaeval common law context facilitated the
systematization of the legal order and its movement toward an
21.

See generally GODFREY, supra note 17.
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overall structure, both in terms of jurisdictional hierarchy and
structural coherence. 22 Hector MacQueen has powerfully argued
that the pleadable brieves of right, mortancestry and novel
dissasine occupied a central place in the development of a Scottish
common law, and that they were in use in Scotland (modelled on
English equivalents) from prior to 1300 until the 15th century or
later. 23
The main, early repository of the Scottish common law was the
Regiam Majestatem. Whilst based on the English text De legibus et
consuetudinibus regni Angliae attributed to Ranulf de Glanvill
(itself an expression of English common law), Regiam Majestatem
also incorporated materials from the Romano-Canonical tradition
and other early resources, 24 in addition to containing a significant
body of feudal material. 25 The date of origin of the text (or texts) is
disputed, though it may have been compiled in the early 14th
century, or even have been older in nature. 26 It is regarded as the
most important statement of Scots law in that period, though it is
supplemented by other texts including Quoniam Attachiamenta,
and the older, 13th century, Leges Quatuor Burgorum. Regiam
Majestatem has itself been referred to in a few cases from the 20th
and 21st centuries. It has, for example, been cited with reference to
guardianship, 27 testamentary succession, 28 reparation, 29 the

22.
23.

GODFREY, supra note 17, at 269.
See generally HECTOR L. MACQUEEN, COMMON LAW AND FEUDAL
SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL SCOTLAND (Edinburgh Univ. Press 1993).
24. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 22,
para. 360, Butterworths LexisNexis.
25. Id. at paras. 366 and 551.
26. Id. at para. 360.
27. Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate, 1996 S.C. 301 at 323, per
Lord Clyde.
28. Clark's Executor v Clark, 1943 S.C. 216 at 223, per Lord Justice-Clerk
Cooper.
29. McKendrick v Sinclair, 1972 S.C. (H.L.) 25 at 56, per Lord Simon of
Glaisdale.

62

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

criminal liability of married persons, 30 and the criminal offence of
rape. 31
B. Feudal Law
As noted, Regiam Majestatem contained a significant body of
feudal material, indicating the presence or legacy of feudalism in
this earlier period in Scotland. Whilst it is unclear when feudalism
arrived in Scotland, it may have been as early as the end of the
11th century, 32 though it has also been attributed to the reign of
King David I of Scotland, which spanned 1124-1153. 33 The idea
was that all land belonged to the Crown, and was “feued” out to
vassals, often capable of further “subfeuing”. This was in return for
services—originally of “men at arms” and produce, or of
commodities, and then for monetary payments called feu duties. 34
From the reign of David I onward, the reach of feudalism was
gradually extended in Scotland with the effect of strengthening
royal control over the territory. 35 Although there continued to exist
pre-feudal estates and lordships, and the campaign of
“feudalization” may have had less impact on lower levels of
society in the 12th and 13th centuries, 36 feudal charters could grant
rights of jurisdiction, particularly manifesting in regality and
barony courts (so-called “franchise courts”). 37 Although franchise
30. Miln v Stirton, 1982 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 11 at 11.
31. Lord Advocate's Reference No. 1 of 2001, 2002 S.L.T. 466 at para. 22,
per Lord McCluskey.
32. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA,
Conveyancing Reissue, Butterworths LexisNexis, para. 5.
33. Hector L. MacQueen, Tears of a Legal Historian, JUR. REV. 1, 4-7
(2003).
34. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA,
Conveyancing Reissue, para. 5.
35. MacQueen, supra note 33, at 5-7.
36. See id. at 14-17.
37. See, for example, THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Criminal Procedure Second Reissue, paras. 20-22. Heritable
jurisdiction was substantially abolished by the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland)
Act 1746. On charter grants in a Scottish common law context, see, for example,
John Hudson, Legal Aspects of Scottish Charter Diplomatic in the Twelfth
Century: A Comparative Approach, 25 ANGLO-NORMAN STUD. 121 (2002).
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jurisdiction was regarded as being distinct from the grant of land
itself, with the jurisdiction being heritable, 38 feudalism clearly had
important consequences for the manner in which the law and legal
system 39 were organised.
The system of feudal tenure was not abolished until November
28, 2004. 40 Whilst the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland)
Act 2000 proclaimed that the “feudal system of land tenure, that is
to say the entire system whereby land is held by a vassal on
perpetual tenure from a superior is, on the appointed day,
abolished,” 41 this was in fact the end stage in a series of
abolitionary steps stretching back over several centuries. 42 In the
wake of feudal tenure came fresh legislation relating to title
conditions and tenemental properties, 43 dealing with specific
proprietorial issues which would arise on the abolition of feudal
tenure.
Kenneth Reid has described the legacy of feudal tenure in
Scotland as “less than might be supposed,” noting that the
abolition of feudal tenure brings “the most substantial reception of
Roman law in Scotland since the seventeenth century.” One
exception to this is the legacy of the affirmative real burden, 44 a
form of condition on the development of land, which Reid
described as “a permanent legacy of the feudal era.” 45

38. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Criminal
Procedure Second Reissue, para. 20, Butterworths LexisNexis.
39. To the extent that it is legitimate to (i) speak of a single “system”, and
not of a mosaic of “systems”, at that time; and (ii) invoke the connotations of
uniformity and regularity associated with a “system”.
40. The date on which the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act
2000 took effect.
41. Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, s.1.
42. THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 18,
para. 113, Butterworths LexisNexis.
43. Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003; Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004.
44. Kenneth G.C. Reid, Vassals No More: Feudalism and Post-Feudalism
in Scotland, EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 282, 300 (2003).
45. Id.
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C. Canon Law
Canon law has left a significant legacy on Scots law and the
Scottish legal system. Papal jurisdiction was exercised with regard
to disputes in Scotland from at least as early as 1170. 46 The Court
of Session (or College of Justice), established in 1532 as the
country's first (and surviving) central and characteristically judicial
institution, comprised a bench split equally between spiritual and
temporal appointees; 47 those in the former category being canon
lawyers. It was a rule, until 1579, that the President of the College
of Justice should be a prelate. 48 This distinction between spiritual
and temporal appointees survived until 1640. 49
Canon lawyers were also active among the practitioner cohort.
Some of these were particularly experienced, 50 and John Cairns
noted that by 1590 there had developed in Edinburgh a
professionalised central civil court patronized by an organised
legal profession “largely trained in the Roman and canon laws.” 51
A number of intrants to the Court had read both the canon and civil
laws predominantly at continental European universities, 52 though
it appears that canon law was in fact taught prior to civil law at the
University of St. Andrews. 53

46. See R.S. MYLNE, THE CANON LAW 9-10 (Morrison & Gibb 1912).
47. ROBERT KERR HANNAY, THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE 109 (William
Hodge 1933); and see also the College of Justice Act 1532.
48. HANNAY, supra note 47, at 107-109.
49. John W. Cairns, Historical Introduction to 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE
LAW IN SCOTLAND 86 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2003).
50. See, for example, JOHN FINLAY, MEN OF LAW IN PRE-REFORMATION
SCOTLAND 87 (Tuckwell Press 2000).
51. John W. Cairns, Academic Feud, Bloodfeud, and William Welwood:
Legal Education in St. Andrews, 1560-1611, 2 EDIN. L. REV. 158, 160 (1998).
52. HANNAY, supra note 47, at 146-147; John W. Cairns, Importing our
Lawyers from Holland: Netherlands Influences on Scots Law and Lawyers in the
Eighteenth Century in SCOTLAND AND THE LOW COUNTRIES: 1124-1994, 141142 (Grant G. Simpson ed., Tuckwell Press 1996).
53. William M. Gordon, Roman Law in Scotland in THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION IN SCOTLAND 19-20 (Robin Evans-Jones ed., Stair Society 1995).
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Cairns also noted that canon lawyers were assisting litigants in
secular disputes. 54 Indeed, canon law commanded persuasive
authority in the secular courts, 55 and canonical materials were
being cited in secular litigation as early as 1380. 56 Even though
canon law was regarded as the “fouler source” or “dunghill” in
some circles, 57 the institutional writer Sir Thomas Craig wrote that
whenever a conflict arose between canon and Roman law, the
former was preferred. 58
It has been said that the Scots law of marriage and testamentary
succession were based on canon law, 59 and that its influence on the
law of obligations was “positive and direct”. 60 The canonical
tradition is also thought to have significantly influenced civil
procedure in Scotland, 61 perhaps influenced by the practice and
procedure of the Sacra Rota Romana. 62 In sum, Lord Cooper wrote
of “the extent to which . . . Canonist traditions permeated the
thinking of Scottish lawyers,” and noted that the “immense debt
which Scots Law owes to Canon Law and Practice has never been
sufficiently acknowledged.” 63 The canonical tradition has also

54.
55.
56.
57.

Cairns, supra note 49, at 31, 46 and 69-70.
Gordon, supra note 53, at 23.
Cairns, supra note 49, at 45.
See David B. Smith, Canon Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF THE
SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF SCOTS LAW 188 (Stair Society 1936).
58. Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act, I, 18, 17.
59. J.J. Robertson, Canon Law as a Source in STAIR TERCENTENARY
STUDIES 113 (David M. Walker ed., Stair Society 1981).
60. W. David H. Sellar, Promise in 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN
SCOTLAND 266 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2004).
61. See Cairns, supra note 49, at 63-64; Gordon, supra note 53, at 19-22;
and J.J. Robertson, The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian Influence with Particular
Reference to Scotland in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW 117-133
(David L. Carey Miller & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Duncker & Humblot
1997).
62. See Robertson, supra note 61, at 121-125.
63. LORD COOPER, SELECT SCOTTISH CASES OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
xxii (William Hodge 1944).
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been described as “powerfully operative”, 64 “longlasting[, and] . . .
profound” 65 in the Scottish legal system.
D. Udal Law
Norse settlers arrived on Orkney and Shetland, two
archipelagos off the north east coast of the Scottish mainland,
around 800. Under their rule, the islands were subject to Norse
law, or “udal law”.
“Udal” derives etymologically from the Old Norse “ođal”,
meaning “ownership of inherited family property in which certain
rights belong to the kin.” 66 The term “udal law” is used in two
senses: narrowly, by reference to the specific regime of land
ownership from which it etymologically derives (sometimes
referred to as udal tenure); and more broadly, by reference to
Norse law as generally applied in Orkney and Shetland. 67
Udal law was maintained in Orkney and Shetland upon their
transfer to Scotland in the mid-15th century. As part of the
marriage arrangements of King James III of Scotland and
Margaret, daughter of King Christian I of Denmark, the latter
pledged the archipelagos in 1468 and 1469 respectively in lieu of a
dowry. Even although Scottish customs and culture had growing
influence on the islands, a parliamentary commission was of the
view in 1567 that they should be subject to their own laws. 68 The
contrary view was expressed by the Privy Council in 1611, which

64.
65.

HANNAY, supra note 47, at xiv and 107.
W. David H. Sellar, A Historical Perspective in THE SCOTTISH LEGAL
TRADITION 41 (New enlarged edition, Michael C. Meston, W. David H. Sellar &
Lord Cooper eds., Alden Press 1991).
66. Michael Jones, Udal Law and Contested Histories of Land Tenure and
Landscape in Orkney and Shetland, 66(3) LATVIJAS ZINATNU AKADEMIJAS
VESTIS 105, 109-110 (2012).
67. William Jardine Dobie, Udal Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY,
supra note 57, at 450; JONES, id. at 110.
68. T. THOMSON & C. INNES (EDS.), 3 ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF
SCOTLAND 41 (12 vols, 1814–1875).
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held that “foreign laws” were no further to be used in Orkney and
Shetland. 69
One of the characteristic features of udal tenure was the
allodial nature of land ownership, that is to say, its ownership by
the “udaller” or “odalsman” without service being owed to a
superior. This stood in contrast to the feudal system which was
widespread in Scotland. The udaller was, however, under strong
familial obligations with regard to disposition of land.
In addition to the udal or “odal”, which was the hereditary
estate itself, there were also common lands which belonged to the
community and were used for pasture, water and so on. These
appear to have been known as “commons” in Orkney and as
“scattold” or “scattald” in Shetland. 70 “Scat”, (from the Norse
“skattr”, meaning “tax” or “tribute”) was paid annually for the udal
lands in the form of butter, fish, oil and coarse cloth. 71 Land could
also be let by the udaller to a stranger for a payment of rent called
a “leigu-burdr”. 72
Although udal tenure is an outstanding feature of the Orcadian
and Shetlandic legal traditions, it did not exist to the complete
exclusion of feudalism. 73 In fact, feudalism came to increasingly
displace udal tenure, such as with the Crown's feuing of the islands
and inducing udallers to receive charters for the sake of having
written title 74—udal land titles were held rather by proof of
possession. Other aspects of udal law and custom were displaced,
such as the more feudalistic practice of primogeniture coming to
supersede partition as the udal mode of succession. 75

69. J.H. BURTON ET AL. (EDS.), 9 REGISTER OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF
SCOTLAND 181-182 (38 vols., 1877–1970).
70. See W.P. DREVER, UDAL LAW IN THE ORKNEYS AND ZETLAND 11 (W.
Green 1914).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 1.
74. See id. at 4-6.
75. Id. at 7.
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Other characteristics of the udal legal tradition included rules
on prescription, 76 the mode in which proprietorial ownership was
passed, 77 a system of land measures (such as ouncelands and
pennylands) 78 and of weights and measures (such as pundlars,
lispunds and cuttels), 79 and the existence of a superior court called
the “law-thing” (under the presidency of a “law-man”), with the
decrees of island courts subject to review in Norway. 80
Much of this system of law has since departed, and the courts
have ruled against its application in a handful of cases. In 1890, for
example, the Court of Session denied that an udal custom, whereby
proprietors in Shetland could demand a share of the value of
whales stranded and killed on their land, had “the force of law.” 81
In an action brought by the Lord Advocate against the
University of Aberdeen, with regard to ownership of Pictish
antiquities excavated on St. Ninian's Isle, Shetland, the Court of
Session held that “the law or rule of Magnus was not still the law
of Scotland in the islands of Shetland.” 82 This referred to a code
attributed to King Magnus VI of Norway which was introduced
around 1274, which would (it was alleged) be determinative of
ownership; but it was not the sum of udal law. Of the state of udal
law in general, Lord Patrick said that “the position was long ago
reached where nothing could be said with certainty to remain of
that law save udal tenure of land, scat, which was the return for
udal lands, scattold, which was a right of commonty, and a few
weights and measures.” 83

76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 8-10.
78. Or perhaps “systems” in the plural, as some measures had different
values between the archipelagos, and it appears that land in Orkney was
subdivided into much smaller units such as merks, uriscops and yowsworths—
see id. at 14-15.
79. Or perhaps, again, “systems” in the plural.
80. See Dobie, supra note 67, at 451-455.
81. Bruce v Smith (1890) 17 R. 1000.
82. Lord Advocate v University of Aberdeen, 1963 S.C. 533.
83. Id. at 556, per Lord Patrick.
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In a case in which questions arose as to the legal status of the
seabed within the territorial waters around Shetland, the Court of
Session declined to find in favour of the applicability of udal law
to the seabed. 84 Although it was argued that in Norway the seabed
was subject to udal law in the same way as the foreshore, it was
held that there was no (domestic) authority supporting that
contention in Shetland. Udal law did not expressly deal with
ownership of the seabed. In addition, as udal land titles were
determined by proof of possession, rather than by writing, it
seemed contrary to principle to expect that udal tenure should
govern the seabed, which was permanently covered by sea water. 85
Whilst much of udal law has perished, udal tenure survives,
being recognised both in statute 86 and case law. 87 Furthermore, the
udal legal tradition may be said more generally to have resulted in
some local differences as to the application or applicability of law.
For example, there was judicial confirmation in 1907 that the
feudal law on salmon fishing rights did not apply in Orkney. 88
There may also be implications arising from udal tenure for rights
relating to the foreshore, cables, pipelines and fishing.
Udal law comprised an additional legal tradition which was
influential at least in one part of Scotland, and which does not fall
84. Shetland Salmon Farmer Association v Crown Estate Commissioners,
1991 S.L.T. 166.
85. Id. at 183, per Lord McCluskey.
86. Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, ss.2(1)(a)(v) and 3(3)(b);
Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, sch. 12, para. 39(2)(b);
Housing Benefit Regulations 2006/213, art. 2(1); Housing Benefit (Persons who
have attained the qualifying age for state pension credit) Regulations 2006/214,
art. 2(1); Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s.50(5). It is stated in the
explanatory notes to the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, at
para. 183, that “Skat is a tribute under udal tenure which equates to feuduty
under feudal tenure. In the case of skat, however, this would normally be
payable directly to the Crown. Payment of skat has survived only on Orkney and
Shetland”.
87. See, for example, Short's Trustee v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland,
1994 S.C. 122 at 128; Kaur v Singh, 1999 S.C. 180 at 187, 188 and 191; Yaxley
v Glen, 2007 Hous.L.R. 59 at 64; and Trustees of the Elliot of Harwood Trust v
Feakins, 2013 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 108 at 116. See also Lerwick Harbour Trustees v
Moar, 1951 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 46 at 48.
88. Lord Advocate v Balfour, 1907 S.C. 1360.
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within the civilian/common law framework. In addition, it had to
be conciliated with the law prevailing on the Scottish mainland,
and this engaged both the law and institutions of the Scottish
mainland.
E. Celtic Law
The content and extent of Celtic law observed in Scotland is
obscured by a lack of documentary evidence. Among the few
surviving documents are Adomnán's Law, from 697, which sets
out laws on armed conflict for the protection of women and noncombatants; 89 and the Book of Deer, which in addition to mainly
Christian texts, contains some records of grants of land.
Notwithstanding the paucity of surviving written material, David
Sellar has made a significant contribution to this otherwise littleremarked pasture of Scottish legal history.
Celtic law is understood as the law pertaining to communities
speaking a Celtic language, rather than any specific ethnic group as
such. Accordingly, Sellar noted that, of the four main peoples who
inhabited Scotland—namely the Scots, Picts, Britons and AngloSaxons 90—only two, the Scots and the Britons, were Celtic
peoples, and a third, the Picts, may have been to some extent. 91
Sellar has argued that “the story of Celtic law in Scotland did
not come to an abrupt end with the advent of feudalism.” 92 He
illustrated a number of instances in which Celtic legal tradition
appears to have made its way into the common or general law of
89. W.D.H. Sellar, Law and Institutions: Gaelic in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO SCOTTISH HISTORY (Electronic version, Michael Lynch ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
90. The Scots, of Dál Riata, were predominantly found in the western
coastal areas of Scotland. The Picts were mainly to the north of the River Forth
and in the east of Scotland. The Britons were found in Strathclyde and the
southwest of Scotland. The Anglo-Saxons were found in Northumbria,
straddling the area to the southeast of the River Forth and part of what is now
the northeast of England.
91. Sellar, supra note 89.
92. W.D.H. Sellar, Celtic Law and Scots Law: Survival and Integration, 29
SCOTTISH STUD. 1, 20 (1989).
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Scotland. For example, whenever the old regality and barony
courts were repledging their jurisdiction over inhabitants from
within their geographical jurisdiction whom had been accused
before other courts, there was a requirement for a person to act in
the capacity of a cautioner—in essence, a guarantor—called a
“culrath” (or variant spellings thereof). Sellar explained that this
represented a technical term of Celtic law, deriving from “cúl”
meaning “back”, and “ráth” a “pledge” or “surety”, the etymology
of the term providing a good explanation of its function in law.93
He cited a number of cases from the 16th century in which this
“culrath” was found, and an unsuccessful attempt at repledging as
late as 1700. 94
Another instance of Celtic legal tradition was that of tanistry,
namely, “[l]oosely defined . . . the name given to the system
whereby succession to office, typically the office of king or
chieftain, is open to various members, or to different segments, of
a ruling kindred, rather than descending by primogeniture down
the one line, as under feudal law.” 95 Sellar cited instances of
tanistry in Scotland from the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, 96 and
stated that it was a “long lasting legal concept” which was
“capable of being harmonized with others from a quite different
background,” including the tutor in both feudal and Roman law. 97
Sellar gave a number of other illustrations, arguing that “[s]uch
survivals are to be seen not as isolated curiosities, of antiquarian
interest only, but as part of the very fabric of a legal system one of
the outstanding features of which has been continuity with the
past.” 98 These suggest that Celtic law is another part of the mixture
within the Scottish legal tradition.
93. See id. at 15-16.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 20. See also W.D.H. Sellar, Marriage, Divorce and Concubinage
in Gaelic Scotland, 51 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GAELIC SOCIETY OF INVERNESS
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F. The Bible
The law of Scotland included part of the Bible. The most
notable example was the Incest Act 1567, which prohibited incest
by consanguinity and affinity with the degrees of relation “as is
contenit in the xviij Cheptour of Leuiticus.” That is to say, the 18th
chapter of Leviticus was directly incorporated as part of the Scots
law of incest. What is all the more remarkable is that this state of
affairs persisted until the repeal of the 1567 Act by the Incest and
Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986.
It is not the only example of reliance on Biblical sources in
Scots law. Sodomy and bestiality were punishable by death as
criminal offences, not due to criminalising legislation, but because
according to the Bible they constituted sins. 99 More recently, the
view was taken in a case from 1963 that two verses of the Book of
Exodus may have been made part of the law of Scotland by a
previous case with regard to liability for animals. 100 In addition to
these specific examples of reliance on the Bible, it has been argued
that Christian theological doctrine, and Calvinist Presbyterianism
in particular, significantly influenced Scots criminal law and its
particular brand of moralism. 101
G. Foreign Maritime Law
The High Court of Admiralty was one Scotland's central
courts, in existence until its jurisdiction was transferred to the
Court of Session by statute in 1830. 102 It commanded jurisdiction

464 (1978-1980), on evidence of Celtic secular marriage in Scotland until the
17th century.
99. Chloe Kennedy, Criminal Law and Religion in Post-Reformation
Scotland, 16(2) EDIN. L. REV. 178, 183 (2012).
100. Henderson v John Stuart (Farms) Limited, 1963 S.C. 245 at 249, per
Lord Hunter; with reference to Milligan v Henderson, 1915 S.C. 1030.
101. See generally Kennedy, supra note 99.
102. Court of Session Act 1830, s.21.
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over prize, 103 maritime and admiralty affairs, both civil and
criminal.
It was stated by Thomas Callander Wade that the law
administered by the High Court of Admiralty was “the customary
law of the sea, and not necessarily the ordinary law of the land . . .
a sort of general law of the sea based on the jus gentium and
customs of seafaring men.” 104 These were formally expressed in
various codes, the most authoritative of which was said to have
been the 13th century105 Rôles d'Oléron, (of which there were
Scots translations 106) which had application throughout
Northwestern Europe. Edda Frankot argued that one can “assume
that the Rôles d'Oléron were part of the central body of medieval
Scottish law,” 107 and that although there is “no specific evidence
that the Rôles were adopted as the official Scottish sea law... that
the extant copies are all part of compilations of the main Scottish
laws does suggest that they were in common use throughout the
country.” 108 Wade also stated that the Lex Rhodia (used primarily
in the Mediterranean), incorporated in the Digest of Justinian, (and
therefore in “Roman law”), was “if not … authoritative, at least …
a useful guide.” 109 There may also have been knowledge in
Scotland of the Gotland or Wisby Sea Law, 110 primarily used in
the Baltic.

103.
104.

Prize jurisdiction is that over enemy property seized or captured at sea.
THOMAS CALLANDER WADE (ed.), ACTA CURIAE ADMIRALLATUS
SCOTIAE xix (Stair Society 1937).
105. See EDDA FRANKOT, “OF LAWS OF SHIPS AND SHIPMEN”: MEDIEVAL
MARITIME LAW AND ITS PRACTICE IN URBAN NORTHERN EUROPE 11 (Edinburgh
Univ. Press 2012).
106. Edda Frankot, Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby:
Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea in COMMUNITIES IN EUROPEAN HISTORY:
REPRESENTATIONS, JURISDICTIONS, CONFLICTS 164 (Juan Pan-Montojo &
Frederik Pedersen eds., Pisa Univ. Press 2007). See also FRANKOT, supra note
105, at 81-85.
107. Frankot, supra note 106, at 164.
108. FRANKOT, supra note 105, at 13.
109. WADE, supra note 104, at xix.
110. Frankot, supra note 106, at 164; though see FRANKOT, supra note 105,
at 88.
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The sources of maritime and admiralty law in Scotland were
considered by some of the institutional writers. Viscount Stair
noted that “the rule by which the Lords have always proceeded in
the matter of prizes hath been the law and custom of nations,” and
that “the Lords . . . do not exclude the defence of strangers . . .
though that be a rule by our custom, but do proceed according to
the common law of nations.” 111 George Joseph Bell stated that
Scots maritime law “partakes more of the character of international
law than any other branch of jurisprudence,” noting that “in all the
discussions on this subject in our Courts, the continental
collections and treaties on this subject, and the English books of
reports, have been received as authority by our Judges, where not
unfitted for our adoption by any peculiarity which our practice
does not recognize.” 112 He listed, by order of authority in that
regard: first, foreign maritime codes and laws (the Rhodian laws, Il
Consolato del Mare, the laws of Oléron and Wisby, the Ordinances
of the Hanseatic Towns, Le Guidon de la Mer, the Ordonnance de
la Marine, and the Code de Commerce); second, the decisions of
foreign maritime and mercantile courts (in particular the High
Court of Admiralty in England, the mercantile court of Genoa, the
supreme civil courts of Friesland, and the courts of Holland); and
third, the works of foreign writers in maritime law. 113
These suggest a broad array of non-Scottish sources in use in
maritime and admiralty causes in the Scottish courts, which do not
appear to align with a simple civilian/common law dichotomy.

111. STAIR, INSTITUTIONS, II, 2, 6; with the “Lords” (i.e. the Court of
Session) nevertheless observing treaties between the King and his allies, “in so
far as they differ from the common law of nations”.
112. GEORGE JOSEPH BELL, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND
AND ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MERCANTILE JURISPRUDENCE 497-498 (5th ed.,
William Blackwood 1826).
113. Id. at 498-502. Several foreign sources are cited by A.R.G. McMillan,
Admiralty and Maritime Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, supra note 57, at
325.
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III. TRADITIONS OF LAW IN SCOTLAND: MODERN
There is another dimension to the concept of a mixed legal
system which has not gone unacknowledged in the literature, 114 but
which should be emphasised as potentially further disturbing a
simple civilian and common law dichotomy. That is the extent to
which two modern streams of law or legal tradition have
permeated the Scottish legal order: the law of the European Union
(EU) and the law on the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). Other “external” streams of law may be making their way
into Scots law, such as aspects of modern international law, but the
EU and ECHR dimensions have arguably had a particularly
extensive impact on domestic Scots law, and for that reason those
two streams of law will be selected for comment.
A. European Union Law
Scotland, along with the other UK jurisdictions, became
subject to the law of the European Communities upon the coming
into effect of the European Communities Act 1972. The norms,
processes and institutions of the European Communities were
gradually developed to the far-reaching extent of the European
Union of the present day. Through directives, regulations and other
legal instruments, much EU-generated law has filtered into and
shaped domestic law in Scotland, as it has elsewhere in the EU.
Moreover, the European Court of Justice serves as the highest
court in matters of EU law, its decisions serving both an
interpretive and adjudicative function with the potential to have
far-reaching consequences for domestic law.

114. See, for example, Örücü, supra note 8, at at 10, 12 and 14; and Chris
Himsworth, Scotland: The Constitutional Protection of a Mixed Legal System in
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS – PERSPECTIVES OF
EVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF
SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 120 (Jorge Costa Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds.,
Springer 2009).
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The substantive reach of EU law is wide, including such
diverse fields as education, employment, health and safety,
consumer protection, financial regulation, companies, competition,
intellectual property and data protection. It has also established
extensive frameworks relating to the free movement of persons,
goods, capital and services, which have implications across several
areas of law.
Whilst it is true that EU law does not regulate everything in the
domestic legal sphere, and that it is often implemented through
media of national law and institutions, as in the case of directives,
it cannot fail to be considered as a major source of law in the
evolving Scottish legal tradition. It brings, indeed, another legal
tradition to Scotland as manifested in the norms, systems,
processes, practices and institutions of the EU—a tradition which
is not confined to a single area of law. The civilian/common law
dichotomy is at risk of looking outdated in the context of such a
pregnant legal tradition as that of the EU; one which stretches
across much of Europe. The EU legal order indeed has great
potential for legal convergence or “harmonisation” across the
member state jurisdictions, buttressed by the judicial clout of the
European Court of Justice. 115 This is a major dimension which
must surely feature in a modern sources of law and legal traditions
discussion.
B. European Convention on Human Rights Law
The law and jurisprudence on the European Convention on
Human Rights is another distinct stream of law or emerging legal
tradition.
The ECHR was ratified by the UK in 1951, but was not
formally introduced into the domestic legal space until the
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. Under that regime,
115. This potential for legal convergence or harmonisation is sometimes
seen as a medium or catalyst by which a new European ius commune can be
achieved.
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courts and tribunals in the UK must “take into account” the
judgments, decisions, declarations and advisory opinions of the
European Court of Human Rights; 116 they must interpret primary
and secondary legislation in a manner that it is compatible with
Convention rights; 117 and they can declare that legislation is
incompatible with the Convention. 118 It is unlawful for public
authorities, which includes courts and tribunals, to act in a manner
that is incompatible with Convention rights. 119 If a Minister of the
Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for doing so, he
may by order make such amendments to legislation that has been
declared incompatible, as he considers necessary to remove the
incompatibility. 120
The human rights framework has had an additional dimension
in Scotland: Acts of the Scottish Parliament are deemed by the
Scotland Act 1998 to be “not law” to the extent that they
contravene Convention rights. 121 The ECHR indeed bears on the
very legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.
The ECHR legal framework as implemented in the UK is thus
an overarching one, bearing on the way in which public authorities
conduct their activities, the way in which courts interpret
legislation, and even the way in which the Scottish Parliament can
legislate. There is, moreover, not only a statutory framework in the
form of the Human Rights Act, but an ever-growing body of
human rights jurisprudence both in the domestic courts and the
European Court of Human Rights. These stimulate a deep well of
human rights law and jurisprudence which does not appear to
resonate with a simple civilian/common law analysis.
Before the “traditions of law” part of this article is left behind,
there is an open question which should be posed: how would we
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Human Rights Act 1998, s.2.
Id. at s.3.
Id. at s.4.
Id. at s.6.
Id. at s.10.
Scotland Act 1998, s.29.
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characterise those great areas of law, especially statutory law,
which do not seem readily to correspond with the aforementioned
traditions? Are the many statutes which regulate fields as diverse
as pensions, social security, health and safety at work and road
traffic to be regarded as expressions of the (English) common law
tradition? Are they somehow connected to the civilian tradition?
Or are they in some other category, perhaps a more general
“modern statutory law” category, whether of Scotland or the wider
UK? Furthermore, what import might devolution hold for this: is
legislation of the Scottish Parliament spawning a nascent legal
tradition, distinct from that of the UK Parliament?
These questions, whatever their answers, lead into essential
issues of methodology.
IV. REQUIREMENT FOR AN HOLISTIC ANALYSIS
Whether or not it is correct to say that the civilian and common
law traditions are the dual foundations or building blocks of Scots
law, those are clearly only part of the story when it comes to
describing Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction. As Chris Himsworth
observed, “the Scottish system is inadequately described simply as
a mix of common law and civil law.” 122 Other traditions have
occupied their own place in Scottish legal tradition, including some
with considerable legacy, such as canon law. It is only by means of
an holistic analysis that we can achieve a more faithful statement
of the character of the law and legal system as a whole, beyond its
prima facie civilian and common law parts.
The first question to be clarified is one which goes to the heart
of the methodology employed in evaluating mixture in legal
traditions. If the principal traditions of law in Scotland are civilian
and common law in nature (and it would have to be shown how
that is so), then this might form the basis for an argument that
those should form the backbone of the analysis. Perhaps the Celtic
122.

Himsworth, supra note 114, at 122.
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or udal law traditions are not worth bothering about because they
seem so remote or marginal, or because their modern relevance
seems so slight. This is essentially a quantitative approach whereby
the analysis seems driven by a search for the size of a legal
tradition's footprint: the civilian and common law traditions merit
the most attention because theirs is the “largest” contribution.
It seems that even a quantitative approach must be at least
partly qualitative, however. In measuring canon law against feudal
law, for example, one must surely take account of the fact that the
canon law influence is arguably the more enduring—in civil
procedure, and so on.
If one insists on a strict definition of mixture, however, a
tradition seems worthy of attention whether its contribution is 50%
or 5%. Of course, we may be tempted, and even justified, in
affording the 50% more consideration than the 5%; but should we
then demote the 5% from our analysis, or from the principal axis of
assessment, simply because it is 5% and not 50%? It sometimes
appears that this is what happens in the mixed jurisdiction
literature, with traditions bearing a smaller footprint overshadowed
by a debate over which of the two major contributions, civilian or
common law, first penetrated Scotland, or which was the more
influential. A legal tradition is the sum of its constituent parts, and
any exclusion of its constituent traditions from the discussion is an
omission. It encourages an incomplete or distorted evaluation of
the receiving legal tradition.
A second issue in methodology is our attitude toward the
temporal aspect of the analysis. In particular, to what extent is, or
should, our approach be time-bound? Are we relaxed about
timelines, or eager to keep “updating” our evaluation of Scottish
legal tradition with each development? Should we, for example,
regard feudal law as a minor contributor to Scottish legal tradition
now that feudal tenure has finally been abolished? Should it have
been demoted in our analysis when the Abolition of Feudal Tenure
etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 came into effect? Or should it continue to
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feature prominently in our analysis because it still underpinned
land ownership in Scotland until quite recently, and indeed because
Scotland was remarkably placed in Europe in having a system of
feudal tenure in place at such a late date? Do we continue to
recognise the extent to which feudal law made land ownership in
Scotland distinctive, or look upon it as an historical artefact? If,
incidentally, we opt for an approach of continual updating, the time
may have come to challenge a straight civilian and common law
dichotomy as “outdated” in light of the aforementioned EU and
ECHR contexts.
The temporal dimension leads into another question: how do
we assess legacy? A meaningful contemporary analysis should
probably not be concerned with bygone traditions that were once
observed somewhere in the land we now call Scotland, but which
are firmly extinct. Instead, we should be concerned with those
which have left some footprint on Scots law or the Scottish legal
system.
The question of legacy is, however, far from straightforward.
How, for example, would we assess the legacy of feudal law in
Scotland? To what extent has the abolition of feudal tenure
diminished the feudal legacy? Clearly the active feudal component
of Scots law has waned, but does that signify a corresponding
diminution in legacy? It is perhaps too superficial to suggest that
the legacy of feudal law is present only to the extent that feudal
components are present, active and visible in the system.
Somewhere between the extremes of the defunct legal tradition,
and that which is still in obvious operation, is a grey area where a
tradition is no longer observed in its own terms, but the legacy of
which lingers on. To what extent has feudal law influenced the
Scottish legal tradition in the longer term? To what extent has it
bequeathed deeper conceptual, methodological or structural
elements to the legal order? How different would Scots law,
including property law and jurisdiction, look today had feudal law
never arrived on Scottish shores?
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The question of legacy is further complicated by another
phenomenon: legal traditions are not discrete. Aspects of one
tradition may, and are perhaps even likely to, inform, shape, alter
or influence others with which they have contact. They are and
have been incorporated into others. That is evident in the very
concept of a “Scottish legal tradition” embodying aspects of other
legal traditions,—civilian, canonical and so on. It is also evident
from the literature; Hector MacQueen and David Sellar wrote, for
example, that “from the time of its emergence in the Middle Ages,
the common law of Scotland has been open to influence from both
the common law and the civilian tradition. It has been a ‘mixed’
system from the very beginning.” 123 In other words, the civilian
and common law traditions were both received into a third entity:
the Scottish common law. It was not the case that these two
traditions arrived in a vacuum, and that the two combined to
produce a Scottish legal tradition. Whilst that might seem obvious,
it is immediately apparent why it is unsatisfactory to measure
“mixture” by principal reference to the two received traditions
(civilian and common law), but not the receiving tradition (Scottish
common law).
The indiscrete or “impure” reality of legal traditions demands
that we revisit the temporal aspect. Consider, in particular, the
extent to which the timelines of the various legal traditions
overlap, and then the corresponding improbability that these
traditions would, or could, be kept discrete. Of the traditions
discussed in this article, the most ancient to be observed in
“Scotland” is Celtic law. This significantly predated the Christian
era, and as outlined, aspects of Celtic law survived in Scotland
until as late as the 17th century. By then, a number of other
traditions were already coexisting in Scotland. Feudalism may
have arrived as early as the end of the 11th century. A Scottish
123. H.L. MacQueen & W.D.H. Sellar, Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law in
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 289 (E.J.H. Schrage ed., Duncker & Humblot 1995).
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common law was in existence by at least the mid-13th century. It
has been said that this was modelled after English common law to
such an extent that it is “legitimate . . . to speak of a Reception.”124
Canon law commanded sufficient authority in Scotland to be cited
in secular cases by 1380. The Roman tradition may have begun to
indirectly influence Scots law from the 13th century, 125 and Scots
lawyers were being educated in civil law at continental European
universities from the 14th century. 126 Even before one folds the
udal, Biblical or diverse maritime legal traditions into the analysis,
the temporal overlap among these traditions is clear.
The coexistence or cohabitation of these traditions was unlikely
to be—indeed, was not—politely discrete. The picture that
emerges is not only one in which civilian and common law were
but two of several traditions; but one of, to adopt a fitting term
used by Örücü, “encounter and combination”. 127 The traditions
would perhaps inevitably compete, compare, borrow, lend,
analogise, innovate, imitate, overlap, contaminate; in short, mix.
This is borne out by some initial evidence which could form a
separate topic of research in its own right: the extent to which the
constituent traditions of Scots law were or are “impure”. As
crossovers, mutations and adaptations occurred, aspects of
traditions would be absorbed into others and even be conveyed by
them. Canon law may be taken as an example. Canon law was
heavily influenced by the Roman law tradition from as early as the
4th century, 128 and continued to be influenced in a variety of ways
in the centuries that followed. 129 The European ius commune was
essentially a product of cross-pollination between the canon law
124. Sellar, supra note 13, at at 6.
125. Gordon, supra note 53, at 15 et seq.
126. Id. at 19-20.
127. Örücü, supra note 8, at 5.
128. See JAMES A. CORIDON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 11-19
(Geoffrey Chapman 1991).
129. See, for example, JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 59-60
(Longman 1995); Robertson, supra note 59, at 112-115; and JOSEPH DODD, A
HISTORY OF CANON LAW 134-135 (Parker, London 1884).
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and Roman law traditions. 130 As such, the practise of canon law
often meant indirectly drawing on the Roman law tradition. In
other words, aspects of civilian tradition were conveyed through
canon law 131 before there was a more direct reception of the
civilian tradition in Scots law. Nevertheless, the canonical tradition
is excluded from the principal axis of civilian and common law
assessment in the orthodox mixed jurisdiction methodology.
Canon law is not alone in its apparent “impurity”. The Scottish
common law was, as noted, open to influence from the English
common law and civilian traditions, 132 and was also penetrated by
the canon law of arbitration. 133 The evolving Scots feudal tradition,
including its more formal and customary aspects, drew upon the
English feudal tradition, and may also have drawn upon traditions
from parts of continental Europe such as Normandy, Brittany and
Flanders. 134 It has also been argued to have been reinforced by the
Scottish common law and shaped by the European ius commune, 135
and the system of feudal tenure may even have incorporated
aspects of Celtic legal tradition. 136
Even the two great traditions often cast as adversaries, civilian
and common law, failed to be discrete: English common law, for
example, appears to have been influenced by civil law, canon
law, 137 and even Celtic law. 138 It is likewise implausible that civil
law stood insulated from the influence of other legal traditions, and
not least from the canonical tradition. The ius commune is just one
aspect of that. Accordingly, even although each tradition has been
130. ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN'S DECRETUM 196
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
131. See David B. Smith, Roman Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, supra
note 57, at 172; and Robertson, supra note 61.
132. See MacQueen & Sellar, supra note 123.
133. GODFREY, supra note 17, at 363-364 and 373.
134. MacQueen, supra note 33, at 12-14.
135. See id. at 17-26.
136. See, for example, Sellar, supra note 92, at 6-7.
137. See, for example, David J. Seipp, The Reception of Canon Law and
Civil Law in the Common Law Courts before 1600, 13(3) OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 388 (1993).
138. See Sellar, supra note 92, at 13.
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separately identified and discussed in the foregoing part of this
article, this has been done for taxonomic convenience only, and
should not give the impression that these traditions were at all
times separate and discrete. They are separately identified
precisely to highlight the diversity of the Scottish legal tradition of
which they became constituent ingredients.
Even if it were the case that the civilian and common law
traditions were the two great streams which emerged from this
clutter of traditions, they were by that stage, whenever it could be
said to have occurred, quite impure. The extent to which they were
impure, or bore the marks of other traditions, is not for this
contribution to assess; but it is clear that the idea of a civilian and
common law template with which to measure the character or
imprint of Scots law becomes less plausible when these
considerations are taken into account. If aspects of one legal
tradition were mixed up with, or latent in, other legal traditions, the
question arises as to the point at which aspects of the former
tradition become aspects of the latter tradition. When one feature is
incorporated into a conveying or vehicular tradition, to what extent
is the bequeathing tradition removed from the equation? Has that
feature now passed into the claim (or even definition) of the
receiving tradition, or has it merely acquired the colour or veneer
of a conveying tradition?
Moreover, if aspects of one tradition become conveyed through
multiple traditions, how are we to characterise those elements? As
noted, the civilian tradition was not only received in its own right,
but also through canon law, and perhaps through other traditions;
even the English common law tradition. It becomes hugely
difficult to separate out all of the civilian strands from the
conveying traditions.
Further still, to the extent that civilian elements survive in
Scots law, they are collectively conveyed through Scottish legal
tradition. The civilian tradition is, of course, conveyed in other
jurisdictions, too, bearing the marks and idiosyncrasies of those
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conveying traditions. As such, which version of civilian tradition is
to be regarded as the “most civilian”? In other words, do civilian
elements not acquire and become bound up in their conveying
traditions such that it becomes decreasingly meaningful to speak
about a single civilian tradition? Or is the discussion purely
historical or genealogical, such that there is regarded as some end
point after which the civilian tradition is either “deceased” or
regarded as something different?
If therefore, the basic argument is that Scotland is a mixed
jurisdiction because it combines the civilian and common law
traditions, the concept of mixture is revealed as selective and
reductionist. First, as noted, Scots law also incorporates aspects of
other legal traditions. Second, even were it convincingly
demonstrated that its dual foundations or basic building blocks are
civilian and common law in nature, those foundations have
themselves been the subjects of mixing, distortion, contamination,
evolution and so on. Neither is purely civilian nor common law in
its own right. Third, the Scottish legal tradition, like all extant
traditions, is a living tradition. It evolves and undergoes change.
Even if it was the case that the civilian and common law
inheritances were the dual foundations or basic building blocks of
Scots law, they have not necessarily remained so. In particular, a
serious contemporary analysis cannot avoid accounting for the EU
and ECHR traditions, and considering the extent to which they
might dilute or further enrich the mixture of existing traditions.
Furthermore, serious consideration should be given to how a great
deal of modern statutory law is to be classified. Finally, the very
receiving of aspects of the civilian and common law traditions was
at least partly achieved by way of conveyance through other
traditions. Those conveying traditions are then excluded from the
basic dichotomy, even although they played a role in the very
manifestation of certain civilian and common law elements.
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Perhaps the civilian and common law dichotomy remains a
valuable tool in the comparative private 139 law context. Perhaps if
all systems were regarded as mixed, in its broadest sense, then one
of the principal tools of comparison would be discarded, and the
special nature of the mixed jurisdiction category lost.
However, the dichotomy faces significant methodological
challenges, and is at risk of tempting a distorted and exaggerated
picture of Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition. It also
arguably offers limited scope in a global comparative law context.
If the world is truly a patchwork, not only of civilian and common
law traditions, but of varying shapes and shades of canon, Celtic,
Norse, Norman, Islamic, Talmudic, Chinese, Adat, socialist, tribal,
customary law, and so on—how meaningful is a civilian and
common law dichotomous approach to the question of mixed
jurisdiction? Or is the mixed jurisdiction analysis intended for a
more limited, European and private law audience? 140 The very
nature of taxonomy may require that regarding every system as a
mixed system is against the spirit of the exercise, but the taxonomy
should not be any more reductionist than is unavoidable; either in
the sense of how many traditions are represented, or the extent to
which traditions are or can be regarded as pure or discrete.
If, however, there is still value in approaching questions of
comparative law by reference to a civilian and common law
yardstick, and in continuing to identify Scotland as one of the
quintessential mixed jurisdictions, that reference to mixture should,
at very least, not be perceived to exhaust the definition. It serves
just one analytical framework, which neither shows the full extent
of mixture within this particular mixed jurisdiction, nor which
properly scrutinises the other legal traditions which may constitute
part of the mixture, including those which played a role in
conveying or influencing civilian and common law ingredients.

139.
140.

See infra section IV.
Id.
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V. OVER-EMPHASIS ON PRIVATE LAW?
The literature discussing the detail and extent of Scotland's
mixed legal heritage has focused primarily 141 on private law. 142
It may be asked why it is that the topic of Scotland as a mixed
jurisdiction has been examined primarily in a private law context.
A plausible answer is simply that it has captured the interest of
private lawyers much more than that of public lawyers. As the field
receives more private law contributions, perhaps public and
criminal lawyers do not regard this as a subject for them, that they
have little to contribute to a field heavily aligned with a private law
analysis.
Perhaps there is a different, or additional, reason: if Scots law
is more distinctive from its English counterpart in the field of
private law than in public law, then private law may be the natural
focal point, because it is potentially where the distinctiveness
factor is at its most pronounced. 143 If that were the reason, or a
reason, the literature would benefit from clarification on this point,
and would in that case surely have to include more consideration

141. Though not exclusively. See, for example, a brief comment on public
law and criminal law in Sellar, supra note 13, at 8-9; a private law take on what
is typically conceived as a public law area in Hector L. MacQueen, Human
Rights and Private Law in Scotland: A Response to President Barak, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 363 (2003); and MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:
PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA, (Reinhard
Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004), in
which there are references to human rights law in the chapter on nuisance by
François du Bois and Elspeth Reid. An exception to the general trend, which
comes rather from a public law perspective, is Himsworth, supra note 114, at
119-141; and see also Esin Örücü, Approaching Public Law as a “Mixed
System”, JUR. REV. 131 (2002).
142. See, for example, Robin Evans-Jones, Unjust Enrichment, Contract and
the Third Reception of Roman law in Scotland, 109 L.Q. REV. 663 (1993);
Evans-Jones, supra note 13; Robin Evans-Jones, Roman law in Scotland and
England and the Development of one Law for Britain, 115 L.Q. REV. 605
(1999); George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating Charges
and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 307 (2003); MacQueen, supra note 1;
Hector MacQueen, Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal Systems, 13
RESTITUTION L. REV. 21 (2005); Whitty, supra note 7; and Zimmermann, Visser
& Reid, supra note 141.
143. This may be the suggestion of MacQueen, supra note 1, at 317.
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of non-private law areas, such as public law and criminal law, in
order to arrive at such a conclusion.
We therefore find that the mixed jurisdiction discussion is
dominated by some quite particular attributes. First, the main focus
in terms of pedigree is on the civilian and common law traditions.
The contributors to the literature have certainly not been ignorant
of other traditions. 144 On the contrary, some have made significant
contributions on other legal traditions, such as Hector MacQueen
on the Scottish common law, 145 and David Sellar on Celtic law.146
However, for whatever reason, these have tended not to be folded
into the wider mixed jurisdiction literature.
Second, the main focus in terms of area of law has firmly been
that of private law. It is not that public law or criminal law aspects
have gone unremarked—again, we find these occasionally
mentioned in the literature. 147 However, the field is dominated by
private law oriented analysis. It is through a private law lens that
the evaluation of the mixed character of Scots law has been made.
These comments are not intended to diminish the valuable
work that has been invested in the private law literature. The
suggestion is rather that, if and until other areas of law are properly
accounted for, it may be appropriate for private law contributions
to explicitly confine themselves to private law, and be cautious
about purporting to speak to the nature of the wider law and legal
system in general terms. Some of the scholarship has been
sensitive to this very point. Kenneth Reid and Reinhard
144. See, for example, acknowledgement of other legal traditions in Kenneth
Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann, The Development of Legal Doctrine in a Mixed
System in Reid & Zimmermann, supra note 49, at 2-3 and 7. Reid and
Zimmermann also described the “deeply entrenched and irreducible chasm
between the civil law and common law traditions” as “exaggerated”, and, even
within the “civil law systems”, such a dichotomy “is in danger of underrating
[their] diversity”—id. at 2-3. Notwithstanding these observations, the
contribution in question still primarily orientates its “mixed” analysis on civilian
and common law fault lines.
145. MACQUEEN, supra note 23.
146. Sellar, supra note 92, at 20; Sellar, supra note 98.
147. See supra note 141.
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Zimmermann, for example, were clear that the two-volume work
of which they were editors, A History of Private Law in Scotland,
was not a “full history of legal doctrine in Scotland,” but was
instead, “confined to private law and within private law to selected
topics from the law of property and the law of obligations.”148
What seems apparent is a potential usefulness of the mixed
jurisdiction category to comparative lawyers as a study in
approximating or conciliating civilian and common law traditions
in the private law sphere. 149 That is different, however, from a
general description of Scots law or the Scottish legal system as
“mixed”, whether in general or in terms of a mixture of civilian
and common law constituents, beyond the significant but limited
sphere of private law.
The orientation of the discussion in the field of private law may
be self-reinforcing, both a cause and an effect of further private
law contributions. Whatever the reason for the topic's principal
orientation toward private law, the paucity of non-private law
contributions cannot bode well for the probability that our
conclusions are sufficiently holistic. The discussion becomes
lopsided. The risk arises that the literature purports to describe, or
is taken to describe, the whole of Scots law and the Scottish legal
tradition; whilst in fact substantially discussing only private law
material. In other words, there is a risk that the mixed character of
Scots private law is extrapolated to the four corners of the legal
order; that the character of a part of the law is used to suggest the
character of the whole.
The literature is therefore in the odd position of having created
a restricted analysis (civilian vs. common law; private law) which
has been too liberally applied to the law and legal system at large.
The mixed pedigree of Scots private law is not in dispute, though
the extent to which it is mixed is disputed. Expanding the
148. Reid & Zimmermann, supra note 144, at 9.
149. See id. at 3-4, though the language used is still one of “legal systems”
rather than bodies of private law.
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discussion to one which embraces, rather than glosses over, public
law and criminal law will enrich the analysis and improve both its
accuracy and its holistic viability. Even were Scots public and
criminal law found to be plain expressions of some single legal
tradition (quite unlikely, of course), then we would at least know
that private law is where the mixed pedigree is found. What seems
more probable is that an evaluation of public, criminal and other
areas of law would reveal a further enriching mixture of traditions
which make up the Scottish legal tradition as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Scotland is a mixed jurisdiction in the sense that it combines a
mixed pedigree of legal traditions. It is well remarked that Scots
law includes inheritances from the civilian and common law
traditions, and often that combination is precisely why Scots law is
described as “mixed”.
However, the literature has tended to focus on the civilian and
common law traditions, often to the exclusion or significant
relegation of other constituent traditions. The mixture also includes
aspects of, at least, the Scottish common law, feudal law, canon
law, udal law, Celtic law, the Bible and foreign maritime law.
Holistic considerations may require that these other traditions are
folded into an analysis of Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction; not
only because they coexist with aspects of the civilian and common
law traditions, but because these traditions have, for centuries,
mixed with each other. The traditions are neither discrete nor pure,
and have informed, influenced and shaped others. Some have
conveyed aspects of others. The extent to which the literature has
focused on the civilian and common law traditions is at risk of
insufficiently recognising or accounting for these phenomena.
The orthodox civilian and common law dichotomy may also
struggle to deal with EU law and ECHR law as two modern
streams of law which are not only making substantial headway in
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Scotland, but in other jurisdictions too. Are EU and ECHR law
civilian or common law in nature? Are they, themselves, mixed in
pedigree? Or are they neither? The same questions may be asked
of large areas of modern statutory law.
The picture of Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction is one of a very
mixed jurisdiction; one which has received and been influenced by
a number of indiscrete legal traditions. Comparative lawyers may
still find value in upholding Scotland as a quintessentially mixed
jurisdiction in the private law sphere, combining civilian and
common law traditions, but these traditions bear the marks of each
other, and of other traditions which they have encountered.
Furthermore, even if they were found to account for a majority of
the mixture, they comprise just part of a wider array of heritages
which, together, make up the Scottish legal tradition.

